Motion to dismiss; Search & seizure; Traffic stop; Reasonable suspicion. Kansas v Glover; People v Pagano; Distinguishing Navarette v California & People v Christie; Probable cause; MCL 257.648 (turn signal use); MCL 257.602 (failing to obey an officer’s directions); Speeding; Applicability of the exclusionary rule; Unreasonable interpretation of the law; People v Lucynski

Holding that the traffic stop leading to the charge against defendant was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and that the exclusionary rule applied, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss. It determined that this case was “distinguishable from Navarette and Christie. Defendant took only two actions that indicated that she might have been driving while intoxicated: she drove straight through multiple intersections with her turn signal on, and she approached Officer [Z’s] cruiser from behind so quickly that he felt the need to change lanes. She may have scared another driver, but there was no erratic swerving or driving over lane markers as in Christie, . . . and defendant did not run anyone off the road like in Navarette.” And while the defendant in Christie also used his turn signal too long, the officer in that case saw the defendant activate it “early and eventually make a turn[,]” which indicated poor judgment or spatial orientation, “consistent with intoxication.” Here, Z saw “that defendant’s turn signal was already on when she was behind him, and she never made a turn before the traffic stop. There are plenty of sober explanations for this behavior[.]” And in Christie, the extended turn signal use was just one of several factors. Finding the facts in Pagano a closer match, the court held that “the extended use of a turn signal alone is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated and warrant the stop of a vehicle.” Thus, reasonable suspicion did not justify the stop. It also concluded there was no probable cause to believe that defendant committed any of the traffic violations suggested by the prosecution. “Neither MCL 257.648 nor any other statute addresses when a person must shut off the signal or refrain from using it.” MCL 257.602 did not apply because Z “was on a routine road patrol and was not directing traffic” when he conducted the stop. There also “was no evidence that defendant refused to comply with any of his orders.” In addition, “there was not probable cause to believe that [she] was not driving at a careful and prudent speed. Accordingly, there was not probable cause that [she] committed any traffic violations justifying the traffic stop.” And the exclusionary rule applied because Z’s “general inexperience as a police officer and unfamiliarity with traffic law resulted in honest but objectively unreasonable mistakes.” Remanded.