Other acts evidence of controlled drug buys; MRE 404(b); Jury instruction on the “doctrine of chances”; People v Mardlin; MRE 403; People v Watkins; Entrapment; People v Jade; People v Johnson; Sentencing; Proportionality challenge to a within-guidelines sentence; “Unusual circumstances”; Confidential informant (CI)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of two “prior controlled buys and in applying the doctrine of chances.” It also agreed with the trial court that defendant was not entrapped. Finally, it rejected his proportionality challenge to his within-guidelines sentence given the lack of case law supporting that any of the circumstances he cited are unusual. He was convicted of meth delivery and sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 90 months to 40 years. He first argued that the admission of other acts evidence (two other controlled buys), “combined with the jury instruction on the ‘doctrine of chances’ denied him a fair trial.” The court found that, under the doctrine, “the prosecution properly ‘weaved a logical thread’ to show that, because of the significant similarity of the other controlled buys to the charged offense, it was highly improbable that the CI was able to successfully hide meth from the police officers on three separate occasions considering that the police thoroughly searched the CI and his car before each buy and surveilled the CI to, from, and during each buy. This is a proper noncharacter inference. Further, this inference lends to the objective improbability that the CI framed defendant for the charged offense, or any of the other controlled buys.” Thus, the prosecution showed that the other acts “evidence had sufficient probative value because it made it less likely that the CI framed defendant. [It] also used the theory of logical relevance that the evidence of the other controlled buys showed defendant’s plan, scheme, or system.” The court rejected defendant’s claim “that the evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403 because of its prejudicial nature.” It held that the “evidence was proffered for a permissible purpose, was relevant, and its probative value substantially outweighed any risk of unfair prejudice.” In addition, the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction. As to defendant’s entrapment claim, his appellate challenge was “limited to the trial court’s determinations with respect to Factors (1), (2), (4), (7), (10), and (11).” The court found that they all weighed against a finding of entrapment. Affirmed.