Prosecutorial error; Closing argument; People v Unger; The rape shield statute; People v Sharpe; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Statements of medical opinion by a witness not qualified as an expert; Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701; Jury instructions on witness testimony

Rejecting defendant’s prosecutorial error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed his CSC I convictions. During “closing argument the prosecutor commented that the victim testified regarding the texture and taste of semen. The prosecutor argued that this testimony supported the victim’s claims because the only way she would know the taste of semen was if she experienced it. Given the victim’s young age and the specificity of her knowledge, this was a reasonable” permissible inference to make. Because the “comment was formed on the basis of the victim’s testimony and was a reasonable inference, there was no error.” Further, the trial court “instructed the jury that the lawyers’ arguments were not evidence, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” As to defendant’s claim that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, “the prosecutor was allowed to argue that the victim’s uncontested statements regarding her sexual knowledge suggested that the sexual assaults had occurred.” The court next disagreed with defendant’s assertion that the rape shield statute precluded him “from introducing evidence to explain that the victim’s testimony of specific sexual knowledge arose from her use of the internet.” He failed to show that questioning her “about her internet usage would have been tantamount to introducing evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct.” In addition, he addressed the issue of her internet usage during cross-examination of a police witness. As to defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to (1) the prosecutor’s closing argument statements, or (2) testimony from a doctor (S) who was not qualified as an expert witness. As to S’s “opinions resting on his own rational perceptions and which are helpful to explain his own testimony,” as they were admissible under MRE 701, the court found no error. And because the record suggested that S “could have been qualified as an expert in sexual assault examinations, any error in the admission of his medical opinions in the form of lay witness testimony was harmless.” Thus, the court could not “conclude that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” on the basis of failing to object.