No-fault action to obtain personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Insurer priority; Domicile; Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co

The court agreed “that the trial court erred when it resolved the factual question of plaintiff’s domicile and concluded that defendant was not the highest priority insurer responsible for paying plaintiff PIP benefits.” Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal and remanded. The court held that the “trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address on the relevant date and granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The affidavit, which supplements rather than contradicts plaintiff’s deposition testimony, raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s domicile, which should be determined by a jury.” The court held that the Workman and Dairyland frameworks do “not weigh in favor of finding that plaintiff is domiciled with his sister at the Judd address. Two Workman factors, intent and residence on the same premises, clearly weigh against a finding plaintiff is domiciled at the Judd address, and the other two Workman factors, informality of relationship and existence of another place of lodging, do not militate strongly in favor of either conclusion. The only Dairyland factors favoring defendant’s position relate to plaintiff’s use of the address for mail, his identification, and other important documents. At best, four of nine factors suggest plaintiff was domiciled with his sister, but with two Workman factors being ambiguous, the total is perhaps closer to only two of nine factors.” Thus, the court found that “a conclusion that plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address is not well-supported by the evidence and thus the trial court erred in concluding plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address given the lack of an alternative.” Also, the affidavit presented “alternative resolutions to the factual question of plaintiff’s domicile, and summary disposition was inappropriate. If plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address for a mere three months 17 years ago, the move to the Seymour address may have extinguished that domicile and established a new one. Alternatively, he may have never been domiciled at the Judd address given his stated intent never to remain there, and the Seymour address may have been his last specified domicile before becoming homeless. In general, domicile determinations are questions of fact for the jury, unless the underlying material facts are not in dispute.” The court found that the “affidavit supplements plaintiff’s testimony and creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s domicile that should be determined by a jury.” As such, it concluded “that the trial court erred when it found plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address and granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant.”