Auto negligence; Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act; The motor vehicle exception (MCL 691.1405); Failure to yield the right of way; MCL 257.649a(1); Speeding; Applicability of MCL 257.649(7) where the vehicles were not at an intersection; Factual & proximate cause; Serious impairment of a body function; MCL 500.3135(1); The court’s jurisdiction; Hannay v Department of Transp; Seldon v Suburban Mobility Auth for Reg’l Transp; MCL 500.3135(5); McCormick v Carrier

In this auto negligence action, the court held that a question of fact existed as to whether defendant-school bus driver (Adams) negligently caused the collision, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff sustained a threshold injury. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition to defendant-school district. The district argued that “a reasonable juror could not find that Adams was negligent, as required under” the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCR 691.1405. The court disagreed. “Plaintiff’s primary theory of negligence is that Adams failed to yield the right of way in violation of MCL 257.649a(1) when he turned into” a school parking lot. The court concluded that, assuming “arguendo that this provision established a duty of care owed to plaintiff, a question of fact exists regarding whether Adams breached that duty. Defendant argues that the yielding requirement of MCL 257.649a(1) is nullified by plaintiff’s own violation of MCL 257.627” by speeding. It contended “that a speeding motorist forfeits the right of way under MCL 257.649(7).” However, that provision “only concerns rights of way at intersections, and undisputedly, the parties in this case were not at an intersection.” Thus, the court was not persuaded that “plaintiff’s speeding automatically forfeited his right of way and relieved Adams of the requirement to yield imposed by MCL 257.649a(1).” It concluded “that a question of fact existed whether Adams failed to exercise reasonable care and caution when making his turn. Video evidence showed that [he] failed to stop in the center turn lane before turning into plaintiff’s lane of travel, despite Adams’s claim that he stopped in the center turn lane for one to two minutes.” As to MCL 500.3135(1)’s serious impairment of body function requirement, the court held that it had jurisdiction to review the trial court’s ruling on the issue and that the trial court’s ruling was correct. The record supported “‘a physical basis’ for subjective statements about pain.” Further, plaintiff’s doctors attributed “his impairments to the collision. And [they] disabled him from work, driving, and recreational activities. Thus, a reasonable jury could find that the collision affected [his] ability to lead his normal life.”