e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 85433
Opinion Date : 03/17/2026
e-Journal Date : 04/01/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Freij v. Freij
Practice Area(s) : Attorneys Family Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - Korobkin, Yates, and Feeney
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Issues:

Divorce; Property classification; MCL 552.23(1) & 552.401; Cunningham v Cunningham; Valuation of disputed assets; Olson v Olson; Retirement accounts; MCL 552.18(1); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D); Reed v Reed; Reassignment on remand; MCR 7.216(A)(7); Bayati v Bayati

Summary

The court held that the trial court properly treated the Charles Schwab account, Apple stock, and down-payment funds as marital property and properly awarded attorney fees, but erred by failing to determine the premarital value of defendant’s Pricewaterhouse retirement accounts and the value of plaintiff’s Chase Bank account. The parties were married in 2012, plaintiff left outside employment after their children were born, and defendant later became a highly compensated equity partner. Defendant transferred joint funds into accounts plaintiff could not access. The divorce centered on disputed financial accounts, the marital home, and attorney fees. The trial court entered a divorce judgment dividing the estate, awarding plaintiff additional Apple shares in lieu of spousal support, and requiring defendant to pay $40,000 toward plaintiff’s attorney fees. On appeal, the court held that the retirement ruling was erroneous because the trial court “erred by not recognizing that a portion” of defendant’s retirement accounts “was premarital property” and by not valuing that portion. The court next held that the Charles Schwab account and Apple stock were marital property because the parties commingled funds and treated them as marital, explaining that “‘[t]he actions and course of conduct taken by the parties are the clearest indicia’” of marital rather than separate treatment. The court also held that the Chase account ruling required remand because the trial court awarded it to plaintiff without valuing it. The court held that the attorney fee award was within the range of principled outcomes because plaintiff was unable to bear the expense and defendant was in the “‘stronger position to pay[.]’” It also held that reassignment on remand was unwarranted because defendant failed to overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Full PDF Opinion