Whether the district court abused its discretion by excusing an ill juror during deliberations; FedRCrimP 23(b)(3); Whether “multiplicitous” counts were allowed to go to the jury; Sentencing; “Obstruction of justice” enhancement based on pre-investigation conduct; USSG § 3C1.1; Effect of the 2006 amendment; “Abduction” enhancement (§ 2A3.1(b)(5)); Impermissible “double counting”

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excusing an ill juror during deliberations and allowing an 11-member jury to reach a verdict. It also rejected defendant-Golobic’s multiplicitous counts argument and his sentencing challenges. When Golobic worked as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, he used his authority to coerce immigrants for sex. He also “impeded investigations into his behavior by exchanging lenient supervision measures for other supervisees’ silence and by destroying evidence.” He was convicted of several federal crimes, and sentenced to 144 months. As to the excused juror, the court explained that Rule 23(b)(3) permits a district court to allow an 11-member hurry to return a verdict upon “good cause.” The juror went to the ER and “received abnormal test results that required further investigation.” He was admitted to the hospital. The jury had already deliberated for five days, and awaiting a diagnosis “would have burdened the remaining jurors with uncertain benefit.” The court also rejected Golobic’s claim that the district court allowed multiplicitous counts to go to the jury, violating his double jeopardy rights. He failed to identify any precedents to support his claim, and “each count required proof of facts that the other did not.” He next challenged his obstruction sentence enhancement for “pre-investigation conduct.” The court acknowledged that it “previously limited the obstruction of justice enhancement to conduct taken after a formal investigation had commenced.” However, in 2026, § 3C1.1 was amended “to require only that a defendant impede justice ‘with respect to the investigation.’” It also upheld the abduction enhancement. The jury’s response to a kidnapping interrogatory did not constitute an acquittal because the response “could merely reflect that a single juror disagreed that kidnapping occurred. The jury did not unanimously find, as it must for an acquittal, that the government could not prove a charged offense and thus did not make a decision about criminal liability for kidnapping.” Lastly, it held that the district court did not engage in impermissible double counting where the enhancements “punish[ed] distinct wrongs: his abuse of his governmental authority, the vulnerability of the victim, and the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim and its potential for coercion and abuse.” Affirmed.