Inadmissible evidence; Prior contact with police officers; Jury instructions as to resisting or obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d(1); M Crim JI 13.5(5); Prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Deficient performance; Prejudice

The court affirmed defendant’s conviction of resisting or obstructing an officer. While defendant “was on bond awaiting trial, he tested positive for a tricyclic antidepressant. Soon after [he] was informed that he would be taken to jail for the positive drug test, [he] fled from the building and was later apprehended by a police officer.” On appeal, he contended “that inadmissible evidence was presented at trial, that the jury instructions were inadequate, and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct[.]” Deputy L’s “single statement about knowing defendant from contacts during a 30-year period does not warrant relief on appeal.” The court found that the “admission of that lone statement neither rose to the level of plain error nor affected defendant’s substantial rights.” Turning to the prosecutor, defendant blamed “her for improperly cross-examining him about his experiences on tether and about cases unrelated to the instant case.” The court found that the “prosecutor’s comments appear to be appropriate in the context of the trial.” It found “no error, much less plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights.” The court found that the “trial court appropriately instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant resisted or obstructed [L], that defendant knew or had reason to know that [L] was ‘performing his duties at the time,’ and that [L] gave defendant ‘a lawful command, was making a lawful arrest, or was otherwise performing a lawful act.’” Thus, the court concluded that “the trial court instructed the jury on each element of the charged crime.” It held that “the trial court accurately and completely defined the elements of the charged offense,” and defendant was “not entitled to any relief for the trial court’s failure to read M Crim JI 13.5(5) to the jury.” Hence, the court found that “it was proper for the prosecutor to refer to that exchange and use it to argue that defendant’s testimony was not truthful.” The prosecution conceded on appeal that another “comment was plainly inappropriate, but contend[ed] that that error did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.” The court agreed. It found that “the plainly erroneous statement of the prosecutor did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.”