Self-representation; Waiver of the right to counsel; People v Anderson; MCR 6.0005(D) & (E); People v Blunt; The trial court’s conduct of voir dire; Cross-examination limits; MRE 611(a); Preventing defendant from personally cross-examining the victim; People v Daniels; Sufficiency of the evidence for an AWIM conviction; Intent

The court held that “the trial court did not deprive defendant of his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel” in granting his motion to represent himself, and did not plainly err in its conduct of voir dire. Further, his Sixth Amendment rights to self-representation and to confrontation were not violated by the ruling preventing him from personally cross-examining the victim (S). Finally, there was sufficient evidence on the intent element to support his AWIM conviction. The case arose from his setting S, his ex-girlfriend, on fire. The court first concluded “that the trial court, at the very least, substantially complied with the requirements set forth in Anderson and MCR 6.005(D).” As to the Anderson factors, there was no dispute he “unequivocally made a self-representation request (Anderson factor one) and that the trial court determined his self-representation would not disrupt, unduly inconvenience or burden the court (Anderson factor three).” As to factor two, the court saw “no clear error in the trial court’s determination that he” knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The colloquy made it clear that he “was educated; had successfully represented himself before; and knew (a) it was ‘unwise’ (‘like a surgeon performing surgery on himself’), (b) trial required special skills to adequately preserve issues for appeal, (c) the prosecutor was an experienced trial attorney, and (d) neither the [trial] court nor its staff would help him. The trial court’s colloquy more than adequately demonstrates substantial compliance with the Anderson factors. So too for those set forth in MCR 6.005(D)—the trial court initially advised [him] of his charges, the maximum sentence, and the risks associated with self-representation and made sure that [he] understood he could consult with a retained or appointed attorney.” No Michigan case law required it to conduct “a word-for-word incantation of a California Court of Appeals decision that” the court block quoted in Blunt. And nothing in the record established “the trial court’s subsequent proceedings ran afoul of MCR 6.005(E).” As to standby counsel questioning S using defendant’s written questions, the court found that disallowing “defendant to personally question [S] after what he admittedly did to her in the name of ‘street justice’ is exactly the type of protection for witnesses contemplated by MRE 611(a).” Affirmed.