Sentencing; Motion for early termination of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e)(1); Whether the district court properly considered the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors; United States v Evans (6th Cir order); Whether a district court can employ a blanket rule requiring a defendant to complete a certain proportion of their supervised release

In this consolidated appeal of two motions for early termination of supervised release, the court held for the first time in this circuit that “district courts cannot employ a blanket rule requiring defendants to complete a certain proportion of their supervised-release term without conducting an individualized assessment of the relevant § 3553(a) factors[.]” Defendant-Collins pled guilty to a drug conspiracy charge and was sentenced to 180 months in prison and 8 years of supervised release. He moved for early termination of his release under § 3583(e)(1) three times. The district court denied all three motions, even though it allowed in its First Order that “further supervision appeared unnecessary to deter Collins or to protect the public.’” On the second motion, in a one-paragraph order it noted that Collins had yet to complete half of his supervised-release term, and that it had a custom of requiring that at least half the supervision term be served before a defendant’s request for early termination will be considered. In denying his third motion, it rejected his argument challenging the “fifty-percent custom.” It explained “that ‘the need to adequately deter criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes’” were the factors underlying the custom. Collins argued on appeal that its methodology did not properly consider the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The court noted that it had “yet to address head-on the propriety of a district court’s ‘custom’ not to consider motions for early termination of supervised release before at least fifty percent of a defendant’s supervised-release term has elapsed.” Doing so here, it held that this is improper. A defendant’s portion of time “served cannot be the sole animating force behind a court’s early-termination decision—[§ 3583(e)(1)] mandates that such decisions flow from individualized inquiries based on the relevant § 3553(a) factors. A blanket rule, or custom, is not individualized.” The court also noted that the district court’s statements in the Third Orders related to deterrence and public protection “directly contradict[ed]” its statement in the First Order, and it did not explain “why it changed its mind. Not did it offer any other § 3553(a) factor to which the proportion of the term completed is relevant.” Reversed and remanded.