Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); Whether plaintiffs’ ERISA claims were preempted by the Garmon doctrine; San Diego Bldg Trades Council v Garmon; NLRA §§ 8(a)(5) & (d); Whether defendants’ refusal to accept contributions constituted an unfair labor practice (ULP) falling within the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) jurisdiction; Whether plaintiffs’ claims were “arguably subject” to the NLRA; Whether the claims satisfied the “independent federal remedies” exception; Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs’ ERISA claims against defendants-Fringe Benefit Funds were preempted under the Garmon doctrine. Plaintiffs (a construction company, Rieth-Riley, and three of its employees) sued defendants for allegedly violating their fiduciary duties under ERISA by refusing to accept Rieth-Riley’s contributions to the Funds that were negotiated under a CBA. After the CBA was terminated, “Rieth-Riley attempted to maintain its contributions to” the Funds. When it refused to sign an agreement proposed by the Funds, they stopped accepting its contributions. Rieth-Riley sued under ERISA, asserting that the Fund Trustees “violated their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence by refusing to accept” its contributions, and that NLRA §§ 8(a)(5) and (8)(d) required the Funds to accept them. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice and denied plaintiffs’ motions for leave to file a first amended complaint and for a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the court noted that when “‘an employer “effects a unilateral change” to the status quo—say, by halting its contribution payments—it commits an’” ULP under NLRA § 8. And when “‘an activity is arguably subject to’” NLRA §§ 7 or 8, “‘Garmon holds that “the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the”’” NLRB. There are exceptions to this rule, including “the independent federal remedy exception, which states that ‘federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies.’” Plaintiffs argued that their ERISA claims were “not ‘arguably subject’ to the NLRA” and that they satisfied the independent federal remedy exception. The court disagreed. The fact that plaintiffs purported “to bring a claim under ERISA does not automatically defeat the Garmon doctrine’s reach.” Further, they alleged that the “Trustees violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA by ignoring their purported NLRA-based status-quo obligation to accept Rieth-Riley’s contributions.” Thus, based on their own theory, defendants’ “conduct was ‘an “arguable” violation of § 8 of the NLRA.’” As to the applicability of the exception, as pleaded in the complaints, plaintiffs’ “ERISA claims can succeed ‘only if’ Defendants’ ‘conduct violates the NLRA,’ rendering the NLRA issues ‘anything but collateral.’”