Motion to compel arbitration of an employee’s claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC; Interpretation of an arbitration agreement; Whether the agreement was unconscionable; Johnson v Best Buy Co, Inc; American Arbitration Association (AAA)

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Rayford, the court held that the arbitration agreement at issue was not unconscionable. And because the agreement expressly provided “that its interpretation falls to the arbitrator, the trial court erred in interpreting it and ruling that plaintiff’s ELCRA claims fell outside its scope.” As an initial matter, while plaintiff asserted “the issue of whether the trial court was permitted to interpret the agreement” was unpreserved, the court disagreed, finding that it was properly raised in the trial court. The court next concluded that under the plain language of the agreement, “the trial court did not have the authority to interpret the arbitration agreement and decide whether plaintiff’s ELCRA claims were subject to arbitration. As a result, the only question that remains is whether the agreement itself is unconscionable.” The court then reviewed Rayford and its recent decision in Johnson, where it considered a similar issue on remand in the context of Rayford. Like the Johnson plaintiff, plaintiff’s challenge here was “‘not to a shortened limitations period, but to an arbitration agreement that was part of a larger employment application.’” As a result, Rayford’s specific holding did not apply, but the standards it applied did. As with “the agreement in Johnson, the arbitration agreement in this case subjected both employee and employer to the authority of an arbitrator who ‘shall administer the arbitration according to the Employment Arbitration Rules (or successor rules) of the’” AAA. Further, it “set forth which claims are and are not subject to its terms, and, ‘[o]verall, there is nothing within the [agreement] that strikes us as unusual, as it contains many provisions typically found in arbitration agreements.’” Thus, the court held that, as “in Johnson, ‘the arbitration [agreement] is reasonable, and in no way’” shocked its conscience. It again reversed the denial of defendant’s summary disposition motion as to plaintiff’s ELCRA claims and remanded for the trial court “to grant the motion and dismiss the case.”