Admission of defendant’s police statements; Post Miranda warnings; Two-stage interrogation; Oregon v Elstad; Deliberate use of the technique as opposed to it being unintentional; Missouri v Seibert; The “Marks doctrine”; Marks v United States; Voluntarily, knowing, & intelligent; Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree home invasion; Right to confrontation; Ineffective assistance of counsel

The court clarified “that, in Michigan courts, the general voluntariness standard of Elstad controls on whether a statement made post-Miranda warnings must be suppressed, unless police deliberately used the two-stage interrogation technique to undermine the Miranda warnings, in which case the effectiveness of the warnings must first be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.” It held that defendant’s police statements were properly admitted and that there was sufficient evidence to support his first-degree home invasion conviction. It also rejected his confrontation and ineffective assistance claims. While in custody, he “confessed to home invasion after he received Miranda warnings. He did so, however, only after being questioned first, before he received the warnings. This situation is called a ‘two-stage interrogation,’ and statements made by a defendant post-Miranda warnings will sometimes need to be suppressed as a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.” The court held that officers “subjected defendant to a two-step interrogation, but” it agreed “with the trial court that they did not deliberately use that technique to undermine [his] Miranda warnings. Given this, his post-Miranda warnings statements need not be suppressed.” It joined “the significant number of other federal and state courts in recognizing Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Seibert as the controlling one under the Marks doctrine.” As a result, because “the officers did not engage in intentional misconduct to undermine defendant’s Miranda warnings,” it turned to the question of whether his “statements made post-Miranda warnings satisfied Elstad.” As an initial matter, it held that he “validly waived his right against self-incrimination.” It further determined that his “post-Miranda warning statements were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent in accordance with Elstad. These statements were admissible, and the trial court committed no error by allowing them to be used at trial.” It also concluded that, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, he failed to show there was insufficient evidence for the jury to “find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator.” Affirmed.