Invasion of privacy & intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Statute of limitations; Distinguishing Green v Lansing Automakers Fed Credit Union (Unpub); Township of Fraser v Haney; Statutory claim under MCL 750.539d

The court concluded plaintiffs’ lawsuit asserting invasion of privacy and IIED claims was timely under Fraser. The trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition when discovery was incomplete, and in ruling they “were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on common law invasion of privacy.” While it did not err in dismissing the statutory privacy claim, it should not have granted summary disposition on the IIED claim “absent a definitive showing that defendants’ cameras cannot film inside plaintiffs’ home.” The case arose out of a dispute between the parties “over the placement of surveillance security cameras on defendants’ property.” Applying the reasoning in Fraser, the court concluded plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing this “suit simply because they did not bring it immediately upon the installation of the cameras. Under Fraser, defendants allegedly violate the law as long as they retain their surveillance of plaintiffs’ property, and plaintiffs seek to remedy the violations occurring within the statutory period of limitations—the three-year period preceding this suit. That time period also applies to their” IIED claim. Given the court’s “analysis under Fraser, whether defendants fraudulently concealed the operation of their cameras” was irrelevant. Thus, defendants did not show “the wrong occurred when they installed the cameras more than three years before suit. Rather, the wrongs occurred when the recordings were made under the analysis in Fraser, and those recordings occurred within three years of plaintiffs’ suit.” Defendants were “not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the statute of limitations.” The court also agreed with plaintiffs that “the trial court erred in granting summary disposition before discovery was complete in this case.” Conflicting expert testimony, “coupled with the truncated time allotted to” one expert for full discovery, showed that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to “whether defendants’ cameras can film inside plaintiffs’ home. Given the disputed facts, the trial court prematurely granted” defendants summary disposition. Finally, plaintiffs “set forth sufficient facts to create a genuine issue of material fact” on their common-law invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion claim. The court found that the “trial court erred in ruling defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.” But as to the statutory claim, plaintiffs “produced no evidence to rebut defendants’ assertion that the security system does not record sound.” Reversed in part and remanded.