Sufficiency of the evidence; AWIGBH; Aiding & abetting; Armed robbery; FIP; Felony-firearm; Right to a public trial; Plain-error rule; People v Davis; Distinguishing People v Buie & People v Kline; Due process; False testimony; People v Smith

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Dunn’s AWIGBH, armed robbery, FIP, and felony-firearm convictions. Also, it deemed his claim of error as to his right to a public trial forfeited and found that he was not entitled to relief. Finally, “the prosecution did not violate Dunn’s due-process rights by presenting [victim-J’s] inconsistent testimony.” As to AWIGBH, the court held that “considering the nature and extent of [J’s] injuries, a reasonable fact-finder may infer the assault which caused such harm was committed with the intent to cause serious injury of an aggravated nature.” It also found that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of armed robbery as an aider and abettor. As to his firearm convictions, the “parties stipulated to the fact that Dunn was a felon ineligible to carry firearms at the time of the offense, and that his rights to own a firearm had not been restored.” Further, the record indicated he “possessed a firearm at the time of the incident despite his status as a felon. [J] testified that Dunn shot him, implying that Dunn was in possession of a firearm. The pertinent footage further portrays Dunn with a firearm when he forcibly removed [J’s] FN Five-seveN pistol from his possession. Thus, the elements of [FIP] were established beyond a reasonable doubt.” And as he “used a firearm in the commission of all” the other felonies, the felony-firearm convictions were “properly supported by these predicate felonies.” He next contended that his mother’s removal “from the courtroom violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” The court concluded that he was “not entitled to relief under the applicable plain-error standard of review.” It found that the “trial court arguably erred if it permitted the removal of Dunn’s mother from the courtroom.” It noted there was “no indication that the trial court considered reasonable alternatives to removal, or iterate[d] findings supporting a partial closure of the courtroom, as required by Davis[.]” However, it concluded the facts of Kline and Buie were distinguishable “in that neither directly involved the removal of disruptive family members. Taking into consideration the rather ambiguous status of the law on the instant matter, we conclude any error that occurred was not plain or obvious.” The record was “not clear as to the speaker’s relationship to Dunn, whether the speaker was actually forced to leave the courtroom, and if so whether the speaker was permitted to reenter.” Lastly, as Dunn did not meet his burden to show that J’s “testimony was false, the use of this testimony does not violate the rule in Smith.” Affirmed.