Sufficient evidence for a first-degree murder conviction; Premeditation; People v Oros; Prosecutorial error; Vouching; People v Thomas; Denial of request for appointment of new counsel; People v McFall

The court held that there was sufficient evidence that the victim’s (V) killing was premeditated to support defendant-Crisp’s first-degree murder conviction. It also rejected his claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for a witness (A). Finally, it concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Crisp’s request for new counsel because it was not supported by good cause. Thus, the court affirmed his convictions of first-degree murder, AWIM, FIP, and felony-firearm, second offense. The case arose from the shooting of A and V. A had “invited Crisp and two friends over for a barbecue. The friends were Crisp’s girlfriend” and A’s neighbor, MM, who was engaged to V. The court held that “Crisp’s statement that he was going to do something to [V] indicated that he had an intent to harm [V]. Approximately five minutes passed between [MM] leaving the trailer and [V] arriving. This passage of time was sufficient for Crisp to have considered what exactly he wanted to do to [V]. Crisp had the additional time to reconsider when [V] knocked and spoke with [A]. Crisp’s shooting of [V] was preceded by enough time for him to have taken a second look at his plan of action and change his mind.” As to his vouching claim, the court found that, considered “in context, the prosecutor did not imply he had special knowledge of” A’s truthfulness. He “did not make any statements that indicated a personal knowledge or belief in [A’s] credibility. Rather, he identified things the jury could consider when evaluating [A’s] credibility. It was appropriate for the prosecutor to respond to Crisp’s arguments by pointing out why the jury might find [A] to be credible.” And the court noted that it “has expressly provided that while vouching is impermissible, a prosecutor can ‘argue from the facts that a witness is worthy of belief.’” In addition, the “jury was instructed that it should not consider the prosecutor’s closing argument as evidence, and it is presumed to have followed these instructions. Therefore, any potential error was cured.” As to the request for new counsel, there was “no indication that there was a disagreement on a fundamental trial strategy” and in the absence of “further information from Crisp, his generalized unhappiness in his trial counsel was insufficient to constitute good cause for substitution of counsel.”