Petition to set aside prior convictions under the Setting Aside Convictions Act (SACA); “Serious misdemeanors” within the meaning of MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii); “Crime” (MCL 780.752(1)(a)); “Enumerated subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)”; “Misdemeanor”

The court held that the trial court correctly ruled that defendant’s “two misdemeanor convictions that were initially charged as felonies constituted ‘serious misdemeanors’ within the meaning of MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii).” Thus, it affirmed the order denying in part her “petition to set aside her prior convictions under the SACA[.]” The court determined that the “trial court properly concluded that ‘enumerated in subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)’ modified only ‘serious misdemeanor’ in MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii). That subparagraph is thus properly read as defining a ‘serious misdemeanor’ as including a violation charged as a crime but reduced to or pleaded to as a misdemeanor.” The court noted that defendant’s “convictions for false pretenses and embezzlement, while misdemeanors, were originally charged as ‘crimes’ within the meaning of MCL 780.752(1)(a). Those misdemeanor convictions” thus constituted “‘serious misdemeanors’ within the meaning of MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii), and [she] could not have those convictions set aside until the waiting period in MCL 780.621d(2) had elapsed (which it had not done when [she] applied for her convictions to be set aside).” The court found that its “conclusion that the phrase ‘enumerated in subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)’ in MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxii) modifies only ‘serious misdemeanor’ is bolstered by application of the last-antecedent rule. That rule provides that, in general, ‘a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the last antecedent, unless something in the subject matter or dominant purpose requires a different interpretation.’” Applying the rule in this case supported that ‘“enumerated in subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)’ should be read to modify only ‘serious misdemeanor’ as the last antecedent.” The court concluded that applying the rule here was “not perfunctory but simply supports the best reading of the statute . . . and nothing in the statute suggests that a different interpretation should control.”