Exclusion of defendant’s concealed pistol license (CPL) application; Relevance; CCW (MCL 750.227); CPL applications; MCL 28.425b(14); Denial of request for a jury instruction on carrying a pistol for a lawful purpose (M Crim JI 11.14); MCL 750.231a(1)(e); Amended information; Due process; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Violation of a discovery order; Prejudice; Failure to meet with defendant to develop a defense; Transporting a firearm in a vehicle (MCL 750.227d); Cumulative error; Second Amendment; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen; People v Langston

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant’s CPL application or in denying his request to include M Crim JI 11.14 in the jury instructions. His right to due process was not violated by the information amendment adding a misdemeanor charge, and the court rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Finally, it held that MCL 750.227 and 750.227d did “not violate the Second Amendment as applied to” him. Thus, it affirmed his CCW and transporting a firearm in a vehicle convictions. As to his due process claim, he did not show “his defense was prejudiced by the amendment adding the” transporting a firearm in a vehicle misdemeanor charge. Next, while he “sought to admit his CPL application into evidence; there is no indication in the record that defendant was prepared to offer a fingerprinting receipt into evidence. Yet . . . MCL 28.425b(14) provides only that the fingerprinting receipt ‘serves as a [CPL]’ after 45 days. Therefore, defendant’s CPL application could not serve as a CPL under the plain language of the statute. Further, even if the CPL application document defendant offered for admission included his fingerprinting receipt, the receipt serves as a CPL only ‘when carried with a state-issued driver license or personal identification card.’ Defendant admitted during the traffic stop and at trial that he did not have a CPL, and he points to no evidence that he was carrying his fingerprinting receipt and either a driver’s license or personal identification card when he was arrested.” He bore the burden to prove he was properly licensed, “and the trial court did not err in determining that the CPL application was not relevant to that issue.” As to the request for M Crim JI 11.14, the court concluded “the trial court did not err in interpreting the jury instruction’s requirements and did not abuse its discretion in determining that it did not apply to the facts of this case.” The pistols here were found in the vehicle’s glove compartment. The court noted that this “could reasonably be described as a ‘closed case or container,’ but not one ‘designed for the storage of firearms.’” Under MCL 750.321a(1)(e), “the ‘closed case’ must be one ‘designed for the storage of firearms.’” Thus, the court held that the “jury instruction is properly interpreted in the same way, to avoid deviating from the applicable law.”