Auto negligence; Comparative fault; MCL 500.3135(2)(b); Huggins v Scripter; Rear-end collision presumption; MCL 257.402(a); White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; Sudden-emergency doctrine; Vander Laan v Miedema; Underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits; Insurance policy interpretation

The court held that, even assuming defendant-driver (Bardo) was negligent because her brake lights and turn signal were not working, plaintiff was more than 50% at fault as a matter of law for rear-ending defendant’s vehicle, so plaintiff’s negligence claim and derivative UIM claim failed. Plaintiff rear-ended Bardo after both vehicles turned westbound. Plaintiff testified that it was “clear and sunny,” nothing obstructed her view, and she did not see Bardo’s vehicle until “we were close,” at which point she swerved and braked but still struck it. The trial court granted summary disposition to Bardo and Home-Owners (plaintiff’s insurer). On appeal, the court held that plaintiff remained presumptively negligent under the rear-end collision statute because she could not invoke the sudden-emergency doctrine. It explained that there was nothing “unusual” about encountering “nonmoving or slow-moving vehicles” on a residential road and that the situation was not “unsuspected” because the potential peril must not have been “in clear view for any significant length of time, and [be] totally unexpected.” The court next found that plaintiff had a clear view the entire time she traveled the 412 feet from the intersection and yet testified that she only saw Bardo’s vehicle when it was “stopped,” showing that “even if Bardo was merely driving very slowly in the lane of travel,” plaintiff still would have rear-ended her. The court therefore concluded that “no reasonable juror could conclude that Bardo was more at fault for the collision than plaintiff,” so MCL 500.3135(2)(b) barred tort recovery and plaintiff’s UIM claim failed as well. Affirmed.