Breach of contract claim related to brokering the sale of a hockey team; Condition precedent; Harbor Park Mkt, Inc v Gronda; Constructive discharge; Tortious interference with a business expectancy

Holding that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract and tortious interference with a business expectancy claims, the court affirmed. The trial court determined that, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the parties had a contract in which plaintiff would be paid some amount of money if he brokered the sale of” an amateur hockey team defendants owned. But it dismissed his claim because he “failed to satisfy the contract’s terms.” The court agreed. Under the terms of the “alleged contract, plaintiff’s brokering the sale of the team was a condition precedent for” defendants’ performance of the contract—if he brokered the sale, they would pay him “a percentage of the total sale amount.” It was undisputed that he “did not broker the sale of the team, so he failed to satisfy the condition precedent to receiving payment, and he has ‘no cause of action.’” He contended this was one of those times a condition precedent did not have to be satisfied, asserting that “defendants prevented him from satisfying the condition precedent by constructively discharging him.” The court held that he did not create a question of fact on this issue because, considered in “context, a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would not feel compelled to resign.” He never claimed that any of the money defendant-Israel was allegedly refusing to pay him “related to plaintiff’s employment” and he admitted “that he had spoken with Israel about plaintiff training his replacement[.]” And another team employee (R) “confirmed that plaintiff had taken steps to train her to replace him. Additionally, plaintiff’s employment contract was set to expire” four months from when Israel allegedly spoke to R. The court added that he “technically could have still brokered the sale of the team after being constructively discharged, so defendants did not prevent this condition precedent from occurring, even if” they constructively discharged him. As to his tort claim, the court agreed with the trial court “that plaintiff had only presented evidence of his general negotiations with the city, which do not rise to the level of a business expectancy.” Further, even if he “did have a valid business expectancy, he failed to produce any admissible evidence that Israel interfered with it.” The court also agreed with the trial court that he did not show that he was damaged by that alleged interference.