Jurisdiction over the children; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); The doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), & (k)(ix); Children’s best interests

The court detected “no clear error in the trial court’s determinations as to jurisdiction and statutory grounds for termination, but [concluded] that further proceedings are required for the trial court to complete its best-interest analysis.” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s termination order and remanded. The court noted that the trial court explained that, under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, respondent-father’s “sexual abuse of JFS put CAZ and MAZ at” risk. It found that because “respondent is the biological father of JFS, CAZ, and MAZ, the three children are siblings.” Respondent’s sexual abuse of JFS was probative of how he may treat CAZ and MAZ, “and provided the trial court a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that it could exercise jurisdiction over the children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).” In addition, the trial court did not err by finding “statutory grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights under” §§ (b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). It also did not err in holding, under §§ (k)(ii) and (ix), “that respondent abused CAZ and MAZ’s sibling, JFS, and that the abuse included” CSC involving penetration. Further, the children’s “relation does not impede application of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect in finding sufficient evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under” §§ (k)(ii) and (ix). Finally, the court held that even if, as respondent contended, “JFS is not CAZ and MAZ’s sibling, respondent’s conduct would still support a finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that CAZ and MAZ would be harmed if returned to respondent’s home.” Statutory grounds of termination would thus still exist under § (j).