Right to a speedy trial; People v Williams; Barker v Wingo; Jail credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Allen; People v Idziak

Holding that defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated and that he was not entitled to jail credit for the time that he was in jail awaiting sentencing, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences. He was convicted of second-degree home invasion, false report of a felony, and malicious destruction of a building. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 8 to 40 years for the home invasion conviction, 3 to 15 years for the false report conviction, and 3 to 40 years for the malicious destruction conviction. He argued the prosecution violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial “by dismissing and refiling the charges against him shortly before the original trial date.” Applying the Barker factors, the court noted that as to the first, length of the delay, he had to prove that he was prejudiced by the delay since it was less than 18 months. As to the reason for the delay, “given that the prosecutor’s delay in dismissing and refiling the charges ‘should be weighted heavily against the government,’” this factor weighed heavily in his favor. The third factor also weighed in his favor as the prosecution conceded that he asserted his right. Turning to the fourth factor, prejudice, the court held that, similar to Williams, this factor weighed “against defendant because he failed to identify any way that the delay prejudiced his defense. In fact, [he] appears to concede that his defense was not prejudiced by arguing that the laboratory report was not necessary to the prosecution’s case because the prosecution already had ‘significant evidence’ to convict” him. Thus, because he did not “establish that the 14-and-a-half-month delay prejudiced his defense, the prosecution did not violate defendant’s” right to a speedy trial. The court next held that he was not entitled to any jail credit. MCL 769.11b did “not apply in this case. Defendant remained in jail because of the parole detainer, not ‘because [he was] denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he [was] convicted . . . .’”