Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Stipulation to the admission of other acts evidence; MCL 768.27a(1); MRE 403; Hearsay; Strategic reason not to object; Distinguishing People v. Shaw; Prejudice; Lifetime registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Kardasz; Lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM); MCL 750.520n; People v Hallak; Whether LEM constitutes an unreasonable search

The court held that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to other acts evidence and hearsay. It also rejected defendant's constitutional challenges to lifetime registration under the 2021 SORA and LEM. He was convicted of CSC I, CSC II, CSC III, and accosting a child for an immoral purpose. As to his ineffective assistance claims, the court noted that “he himself made the informed decision to stipulate to” admission of the other acts evidence, and the court concluded that “defense counsel’s decision not to object to certain hearsay was supported by sound trial strategy.” The court found that, regardless of whether objecting to the other acts “evidence would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for defendant,” it could not “conclude that defense counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable when he advised defendant about his options for ‘several hours’ and ultimately pursued the trial strategy that defendant requested.” Next, even if police officers’ testimony repeating statements the victims made to them “was objectionable hearsay, defense counsel’s decision not to object was not objectively unreasonable. The hearsay that defense counsel allegedly overlooked was possibly beneficial to the defense, or at least it was much less damaging than was the hearsay in Shaw.” The court added that failing to object “did not prejudice defendant’s case.” It noted that “the declarants had already testified about the matter asserted in those statements and were subject to cross-examination.” As to his cruel or unusual punishment challenge to his SORA registration requirement, because the court reached “the same conclusions as the Kardasz Court for each” of the relevant factors, it was “bound to reach the same conclusion: the 2021 SORA’s lifetime registration requirement was not grossly disproportionate and did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment as applied to defendant.” As to the same challenge to the LEM requirement, similar to in Hallak, the court concluded “that LEM is not cruel or unusual punishment as applied to defendant in this case.” It noted that he “was convicted of four offenses that would each require LEM individually, along with three other sexual offenses. There were four victims, and the testimony asserted that there were improper sexual acts involving two additional family members.” His Fourth Amendment challenge also failed under Hallak. Affirmed.