Divorce; Property division; Sparks v Sparks; Pension award; Voluntary underemployment; General principles of equity; Valuation & apportionment of marital home equity; Distinguishing Reeves v Reeves; Repudiation theory; Applicability of MCL 552.401; Valuation date; Judge reassignment in family court cases; MCL 600.1011(1) & (5); MCR 8.111(C); Alleged violation of MCR 2.517; Motion in limine to limit testimony about a party’s tort claims against the other; Statute of limitations; Economic exploitation as intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Distinguishing Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co; Harmless error

The court held that the trial court did not err in determining “an equitable property distribution and valued and apportioned the equity in the marital home[.]” While it erred in limiting evidence at trial about plaintiff-ex-husband’s alleged economic abuse, this was harmless. It also held that the trial court did not err in “issuing a post-tort-trial opinion and order signed by a judge who had not presided over the property-disposition phase of the case” or in granting plaintiff’s motion in limine “to limit the tort trial testimony to events occurring within the statute of limitations.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dividing defendant-ex-wife’s “pension benefits and the equity in the marital home following the” judgment of divorce. She first argued on appeal “that a successor judge who did not preside over the bench trial could not possibly determine the division of a marital estate without violating” MCR 2.517. But the court did not “see why MCL 600.1011(5) would authorize reassigning cases to a successor judge and why MCR 8.111(C) would require the successor judge to take on any pending matters if doing so would necessarily result in a violation of MCR 2.517.” Next, while it agreed the trial court erred in “excluding evidence of plaintiff’s economic exploitation,” it concluded the error was harmless. “The trial court erroneously interpreted Roberts” in denying defendant the opportunity to present this evidence. “There is a significant difference between an insurance company’s refusal to pay contractual benefits and the type of economic exploitation that defendant alleged in her IIED claim.” But in light of the three-year statutory period of limitations for the IIED claim, the error was harmless. As to the division of the marital assets, the court rejected defendant’s argument that awarding “plaintiff half of defendant’s pension was inequitable because plaintiff concealed and wasted most of his own retirement funds.” In addition, it was “not convinced that the trial court’s division of marital assets was inequitable just because it did not credit defendant for her down payment on the marital home.” It noted that Reeves was distinguishable “because defendant purchased the marital home during the marriage. The parties also stipulated that the marital home ‘is by law a marital asset’ without carving out any exceptions, and they stipulated” to its value.