Sentencing; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Stovall; Fourth habitual offender enhancement (MCL 769.12(1)(a)); Mandatory minimum sentence; People v Burkett; Separation of powers

The court held that defendant’s mandatory 25-year minimum sentence under the fourth-offense habitual-offender statute was not cruel or unusual punishment and did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. Defendant was convicted of AWIGBH, third-offense domestic violence, unlawful imprisonment, and obstruction of justice after he put his hand around his girlfriend’s throat and held her against a wall while she was trying to leave her house. At sentencing, he argued that the mandatory minimum sentence in MCL 769.12(1)(a) was unconstitutional because it left the trial court with “no discretion,” but the trial court imposed the 25-year minimum after finding the sentence proportionate in light of defendant’s extensive assaultive criminal history and the violent nature of the current offenses. On appeal, the court held that the sentence survived a cruel-or-unusual-punishment challenge because legislatively mandated sentences are “presumptively proportional and presumptively valid,” and defendant showed no “unusual circumstances” overcoming that presumption. The court next held that Burkett controlled. The court found there that MCL 769.12(1)(a) reflects “a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.” The court also rejected the separation-of-powers challenge, explaining that “the ultimate authority to provide for criminal offenses is constitutionally vested in the Legislature,” while the judiciary’s role is to impose sentence “within the limits imposed by the Legislature.” It concluded that MCL 769.12(1)(a) is simply a mandatory sentencing statute that “sharply limits judicial discretion,” which is constitutionally permissible. Affirmed.