Self-defense jury instruction on FIP & felony-firearm charges; Distinguishing People v Dupree (Dupree I & II); The Self-Defense Act; MCL 780.972(2); Motion for a mistrial; Statements about defendant’s potential drug use; Waiver

The court held that the trial court did not (1) abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a self-defense instruction on the FIP and related felony-firearm charges or (2) err in denying his motion for a mistrial based on statements about his potential drug use. He was convicted of FIP, felony-firearm, having possession of metallic knuckles, and CCW. The case arose from an incident involving an argument with his wife. He admitted at trial that he had held “the gun but asserted that it was in self-defense.” Unlike in Dupree, the undisputed evidence here was “that it was defendant, a convicted felon, who brought the gun onto the premises.” His wife testified that he told her that the woman with whom he was having an affair “and her family were threatening her and defendant, and that that was the reason he brought the gun to their house on Thursday night. She said she never touched the weapon, and that he pointed it at her, told her during the argument that he brought it to protect her, and simply made up the story about her pointing it at him. Defendant’s wife’s testimony is corroborated by a video admitted as evidence at trial in which [he] can be heard saying ‘I brought a gun here. I brought a gun here. So f*****g what.’ Defendant denied during the trial that he pointed the gun at her. But he never even attempted to rebut the evidence indicating that he brought the gun onto the premises. Thus,” he could not meet Dupree I’s second prong – he could not show “that he did not negligently place himself in a situation where he or she would be forced to engage in criminal conduct when he illegally brought a gun onto the premises. As a result, under the facts of this case,” he did not offer sufficient evidence to support a self-defense instruction. As to his wife’s comment at trial about his drug use, the “trial court’s instruction is presumed to cure any potential error arising from” that testimony, and the jury was presumed to have followed the instruction. As to police officer witnesses’ statements about his potential drug use, the statements “were ‘unresponsive, volunteered answers to a proper question’ and are not grounds for a mistrial.” If he had asked for a curative instruction as to their “statements about ‘white residue,’ ‘white powder,’ and ‘using,’ then any error could have been cured.”