No-fault benefits; Causation under MCL 500.3105(1); McPherson v McPherson; Summary disposition; Genuine issue of material fact; MCR 2.116(C)(10); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co; Expert testimony; Factual basis for opinion; MRE 703; Skinner v Square D Co; Computed tomography angiography (CTA)

The court held that the trial court properly denied defendant-insurer’s motion for summary disposition because plaintiff’s expert testimony created a genuine issue of material fact whether his brain injury arose out of the operation of the motor vehicle rather than from a spontaneous aneurysm rupture. Plaintiff (who died after this case was filed) was involved in a single-car crash at a hospital, where he hit a gate, ran over signs, and struck a concrete barrier. Imaging later revealed a large intracranial hemorrhage and a partially thrombosed aneurysm. Defendant denied PIP benefits on the theory that plaintiff’s injuries did not arise from the use of the vehicle because “his injuries resulted from a ruptured aneurysm, not from the operation of a motor vehicle,” and it moved for summary disposition on that basis. On appeal, the court held that MCL 500.3105(1) requires a causal connection “more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for,” and that the trial court correctly found a factual dispute on that issue. The court found that plaintiff’s expert testimony supported “a reasonable inference that the hematoma surrounding plaintiff’s brain was caused by head trauma sustained during the automobile collision with the concrete barrier, rather than by the aneurysm in his brain rupturing prior to the accident and causing the collision.” The court emphasized that the expert “rejected the possibility that the aneurysm discovered during surgery caused the collision” because the aneurysm “did not appear on the CTA scan,” meaning that “no blood was flowing through it, and without blood flow, it could not have bled and caused the hematoma[.]” It also rejected defendant’s attack on the expert’s credibility, explaining that an expert’s credibility is for the jury and that the trial court “‘may not resolve factual disputes or determine credibility in ruling on a summary disposition motion.’” Affirmed.