Removal; MCL 712A.13a(9); MCR 3.965(C)(2); Waiver; In re Ferranti; Plain error review; Adjudication; Exercise of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Separate adjudication of respondents; In re Sanders; Hearsay; Then-existing state of mind exception (MRE 803(3)); People v Moorer; Opposing-party statement (MRE 801(d)(2)); Credibility determinations; Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Personal protection order (PPO)

In this consolidated appeal, the court rejected respondent-father’s challenges to the children’s removal and held that the trial court did not clearly err in assuming jurisdiction over them. Two separate child protective proceedings were at issue, one involving one child (RWA1) and the other involving two children. As to the children’s removal, as an initial matter the court rejected the DHHS’s argument that the father waived the issue, concluding that his failure to timely appeal the removal orders did not constitute a waiver. Turning to the required factors, the court held as to MCL 712A.13a(9)(a) that “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the children would be at a substantial risk of harm if they remained in” the father’s custody. The domestic violence concerns equally applied to all “the children, not just RWA1. Nor did the trial court limit its consideration of domestic violence to RWA1.” The record indicated the father “was the perpetrator of domestic violence” and the court determined that a CPS employee’s testimony supported “the trial court’s finding that the children would be at a substantial risk of harm in” the father’s care. And while it “ultimately determined that respondent-mother could remain in the home with the younger children, that does not necessarily preclude its finding that respondent-father placed [them] at a substantial risk of harm by allowing them to reside with [the] mother following RWA1’s sexual abuse allegations.” The court also held that a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding as to MCL 712A.13a(9)(b). “Given the concerns about [the] father’s domestic violence, and the unreliability of” a PPO that was in place, it did not clearly err in “finding that no other arrangement except removal from [the] father was reasonably available to safeguard the children from harm.” As to MCL 712A.13a(9)(c), a preponderance of the evidence also supported a “finding that ‘[c]ontinuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s welfare.’” Finally, the record likewise supported its finding as to MCL 712A.13a(9)(e). As to the adjudication, the court held that the testimony established both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2) by a preponderance of the evidence. Affirmed.