Resentencing for first-degree murder committed when defendant was a juvenile; Miller v Alabama; People v Boykin; Consideration of youth as a mitigating factor; People v Snow; Proportionality & reasonableness; Alleged unconstitutional de facto life sentence; 70-year maximum sentence; MCL 769.25(9); People v Meadows; Limited scope of prior remand; Ineffective assistance of counsel

Rejecting defendant’s arguments that he was entitled to another Miller resentencing, the court affirmed his 40 to 70-year sentence. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and murder of a peace officer for crimes committed when he was 16. He argued that the trial court at resentencing failed to “properly consider his youth as a mitigating factor at resentencing as required by Miller and” Boykin. The court found no merit in his claims. To the extent he suggested “the trial court, in imposing its term-of-years sentence, was required to make specific findings on the record regarding its consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth and each of the Snow factors, caselaw” holds otherwise. All the trial court was required to do was provide “an explanation sufficient to facilitate appellate review of the sentence and its proportionality.” The record here was “more than sufficient to facilitate such review, and makes clear that the trial court properly considered defendant’s youth in light of Miller and Snow when fashioning a sentence that was duly proportionate to the offense and the offender.” Consistent with those cases, it “duly considered defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating and properly incorporated that consideration into its determination of a proportionate sentence for this offense and offender.” The characteristics of his “youth at the time of the offense, such as impulsivity and potential for reform, led [it] to conclude that the possibility of parole should not be fully eliminated, and a very lengthy term-of-years sentence would be most suitable for defendant and his crime.” While he offered several reasons why he thought the record supported “‘a more lenient sentence’” the court noted that “the trial court did find reasons for leniency in” the considerations he cited—just not to the extent he desired. The court also rejected his de facto life sentence argument, noting that his sentence left open the possibility of parole when he is 58 years old. As to his claim that his maximum sentence exceeded a 60-year cap, “he was resentenced under MCL 769.25 rather than MCL 769.25a.” Thus, MCL 769.25(9), which provides for a maximum term of “not less than 60 years[,]” applied, not MCL 769.25a(4)(c), which provides for a maximum term of 60 years. The trial court “had discretionary authority under the statute to sentence [him] to a maximum of 70 years.”