Postconviction relief; Successive motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a); People v Lemons; Sentencing; Acquitted conduct; People v Beck; Retroactivity; Collateral review; People v Motten

The court held that as Beck did not apply retroactively on collateral review, defendant was not entitled to file a successive motion for relief from judgment based on his acquitted-conduct sentencing claim. After a 2011 jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, conspiracy, cocaine possession, resisting and obstructing, fleeing and eluding, FIP, and felony-firearm, but was acquitted of murder charges stemming from a drug-transaction shooting. The trial court denied his request for leave to file another motion for relief from judgment after he argued that Beck retroactively barred the sentencing court from relying on the victim’s death. On appeal, the court noted that MCR 6.502 generally limits a defendant to “one and only one motion for relief from judgment” and allows a successive motion only when there has been “a retroactive change in the law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment was filed.” The court held that although Beck declared that “due process bars sentencing courts from finding by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant engaged in conduct of which he was acquitted,” that rule could not help defendant because Motten had already concluded that “Beck’s holding is not retroactive on collateral review.” Because Motten is binding, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave under MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a). Affirmed.