Criminal contempt; MCL 600.1711(1); People v MacLean; Due process; Notice of contempt charges; MCL 600.1711(2); In re Contempt of Henry; Judicial disqualification; Appearance of impropriety; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b)(ii); People v Loew; Guardianships; Right to counsel; MCL 700.5304; In re Malloy Guardianship

The court held that the criminal-contempt order had to be reversed because the evidence was insufficient and appellant’s due-process rights were violated, although the probate court did not err by temporarily restricting his contact with the ward (JO) concerning the jury-demand issue. The case arose after appellant, an attorney and former counsel for JO, appeared in a guardianship matter, filed an appearance and jury demand, and was later accused by the probate court of making misrepresentations about whether he had spoken with JO before doing so. The probate court ultimately found him in criminal contempt. On appeal, the court held that criminal contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that the record did not clearly and unequivocally show a willful disregard of the probate court’s authority. It emphasized that whether appellant had been dishonest depended on facts outside the judge’s personal knowledge, so he could not be punished summarily based only on an alleged in-court inconsistency. Further, “[s]elf-contradiction alone cannot be a basis for the exercise of a power our Supreme Court has deemed ‘awesome’ and to be used ‘with the utmost restraint.’” The court next held that due process was denied because appellant was not given notice of the charges in a manner consistent with MCL 600.1711(2) and MCR 3.606(A), which require some form of proof of the facts charged and an opportunity to defend. The court also held that reassignment was necessary because the judge’s remarks suggested “the trial court would have difficulty putting aside its previously expressed views, and” the court concluded “the appearance of justice would be better served by remanding” the contempt proceedings to a different judge. But it held that the limited 21-day restriction on contact with JO about a jury trial did not violate JO’s rights because it was narrowly tailored to protect the fairness and ethical integrity of the proceedings. Reversed and remanded for vacatur of the contempt judgment and dismissal, with any further contempt proceedings to be heard by a different judge.