Habeas corpus; Right of confrontation; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to employ a medical expert to challenge the state’s expert; Whether the state appellate court’s determination that petitioner’s attorneys were not deficient was an unreasonable application of law; The Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) standard; 28 USC § 2254(d)(1); Prejudice

The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus on petitioner-Jones’s claims that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for not presenting testimony from a forensic expert to counter the state’s expert, and (2) his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by allowing witnesses to testify to out-of-court statements his wife made. Jones was found guilty of aggravated murder, murder, and rape. In his habeas petition, he raised right of confrontation and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As to his Confrontation Clause claim, the court found “the Ohio Supreme Court reasonably concluded that” his wife’s (D) statements to witness-J “were non-testimonial and that Jones’s confrontation rights were not violated by the admission of [J’s] statements.” The government agreed with Jones that the other witness’s (M) testimony about D’s “out-of-court statements violated Jones’s confrontation rights. The only” issue on appeal was whether the Ohio Supreme Court’s conclusion that it “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was reasonable under § 2254(d).” The court concluded that given Jones admitted killing the victim (Y) “and there was significant other evidence to support the verdict, [M’s] erroneously admitted testimony seemingly had little effect.” He next argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not using “an expert to rebut the state’s finding of rape.” The court concluded that this claim failed on the prejudice prong, holding “that the state court’s conclusion that Jones could not show prejudice was a reasonable application of federal law.” It noted that “even Jones’s hand-picked expert . . . could not rebut much of the physical evidence that the state presented against him. An objectively reasonable state court could therefore find that, even if Jones’s counsel had employed an expert to counter [the state’s expert], there would not be a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”