Motion to change child’s domicile; MCL 722.31(4); Factors (4)(a)-(c) & (e); Yachcik v Yachcik; Credibility determinations

Holding that the trial court’s findings on the challenged MCL 722.31(4) factors were not against the great weight of the evidence, the court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-father’s motion to change the domicile of the parties’ child. He challenged the trial court’s findings on all of the 722.31(4) factors except (d). As to factor (a), the trial court found that he failed to show “the move would improve the quality of his and” the child’s (IS) lives on any of the asserted “grounds—i.e., his wife’s increased earning capacity, safety, and better educational and extracurricular opportunities. It further found that the move would ‘uproot[]’ IS’s life by, in relevant part, moving her away from plaintiff, certain family, and IS’s friends. None of these findings were against the great weight of the evidence.” Further, the trial court’s finding that factor (b) “weighed against a domicile change was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” The trial court determined “that ‘each party ha[d] exercised regular parenting time with’” IS. While defendant and his wife testified that plaintiff-mother “did not use all her court-ordered parenting time,” the court deferred “to the trial court’s decision to credit” her testimony that, when she did not do so, it was for legitimate reasons, including her hospitalization for complications with a high-risk pregnancy. As to factor (c), the court held that the trial court’s finding “that defendant’s proposed parenting schedule was not sufficient to ‘preserve and foster’ the relationship between plaintiff and IS” was not against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant and his wife proposed “having defendant travel to Michigan with IS, paying for plaintiff’s travel to Georgia, and providing IS a phone with which she could communicate with plaintiff any time.” But plaintiff testified “she had never gone more than seven days without seeing IS and did not want to regularly go days-at-a-time without seeing her. She” also asserted that traveling back and forth between the states was not feasible for her given that she had an infant child. As to factor (e), “any evidence of domestic violence related to events that allegedly occurred before entry of the” 11/24 order. Given that defendant’s counsel agreed that the hearing’s scope “was limited to events occurring after that order, the trial court’s findings as to this factor were not against the great weight of the evidence.” Affirmed.