e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 85659
Opinion Date : 04/27/2026
e-Journal Date : 04/28/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : In re Estate of Nielsen
Practice Area(s) : Wills & Trusts
Judge(s) : Garrett, Rick, and Feeney
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Issues:

The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC); MCL 700.2405(1); Whether bequests constituted a “general” or “specific” devise; In re Corby’s Estate; Morrow v Detroit Trust Co; Distinguishing In re Guise Estate (Unpub); “Otherwise sufficient”; Exempt-property allowance under MCL 700.2404; Whether a life insurance policy & a vehicle were trust assets; Membership interest in an LLC; MCL 450.4504

Summary

The court held that the probate court erred in ruling that a devise in the decedent’s (Neal) will to his ex-wife (appellant-Paula) was a general, rather than a specific, devise. “Because the devise was specific,” if Neal’s estate is “otherwise sufficient” under MCL 700.2405(1), his “children may not select items from the devise to fulfill their exempt-property allowance.” The court concluded the probate court properly ruled that a life insurance policy on Paula’s life and a vehicle were assets of Neal’s trust. Thus, it reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for the probate court to “determine whether Neal’s estate was otherwise sufficient[.]” Under MCL 700.2405(1), if the “estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised shall not be used to satisfy rights to homestead allowance or exempt property.” The court noted that while “EPIC defines the term ‘devise,’ it does not define ‘specific devise’ or ‘general devise.’” But when EPIC was enacted, these terms had common-law meanings, and those meanings are consistent with the dictionary definitions. Here, “Neal did not devise to Paula a quantity of property payable from his estate’s general assets. Rather, he bequeathed to Paula specific items and used the term ‘my’ preceding the list of items he left” her. Under Morrow, “the word ‘my’ is indicative of a specific devise. Moreover, nothing indicates that Neal intended Paula to receive something of equal value in lieu of the items listed. The fact that the items were listed in categories does not indicate that the devises were general instead of specific.” It appeared from his will that Neal “intended Paula to have all his personal property included in the categories of items he left her.” The court held that, if the “estate is otherwise sufficient as stated in MCL 700.2405(1), Paula is entitled to the gun collection, University of Michigan memorabilia, insurance proceeds in the amount of $9,100, and the bedroom furniture.” It rejected her claim “that the children waived their right to their exempt-property allowance by failing to timely assert the right. MCL 700.2405 does not provide a limitations period for asserting a right to exempt property.” As to the policy, if the divorce property settlement entitled Paula to it, she did not timely assert her claim. The vehicle was owned by Neal’s LLC, and his LLC membership interest poured over into his trust.

Full PDF Opinion