Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27b(1) & (4)(d); People v Rosa; MRE 404(b); People v VanderVliet; People v Mardlin; Common scheme; Danger of unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Limiting jury instruction; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a special jury instruction on what constituted reasonable force for parental discipline; Standard jury instruction comporting with M Crim JI 17.24 & consistent with MCL 750.136b(9); Sufficiency of the evidence for a second-degree child abuse conviction

The court held that the other acts evidence at issue was probative, and while “it was prejudicial to defendant,” it was not so prejudicial that the court was convinced the trial court’s decision to admit it “under MRE 404(b) fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes.” The court also held that (1) his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a special jury instruction on “what constituted reasonable force for parental discipline” and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support his second-degree child abuse conviction. He was also convicted of domestic violence (second offense). The case arose from his “physical attack on his eight-year-old son.” He argued that he was “entitled to a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting” other acts evidence of his “history of child abuse and domestic violence.” As to admission under MCL 768.27, the court noted the trial court dismissed the 10-year limitation in MCL 768.27b(4)(d) “as ‘arbitrary’ and admitted the evidence in the interest of justice for the same reasons that it would otherwise have been admitted if it had occurred less than 10 years ago.” But it also determined that the “evidence was admissible under MRE 404(b) because it demonstrated evidence of intent, absence of mistake, lack of accident, or common plan or scheme.” And in contrast to MCL 768.27b, MRE 404(b) does not have a temporal limitation. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the “evidence was both material and probative as to defendant’s common plan or scheme of using physical abuse as parental discipline against his children.” It concluded the evidence had “sufficient common features to the actions” for which he was charged here. The “evidence reflected that defendant previously grabbed one of his children by her hair and lifted her nearly off the ground and, in this case, [he] grabbed the victim by his head and forced him onto his bed. The trial court found that this evidence was probative because it tended to show intent, absence of mistake, absence of accident, or common plan or scheme.” The court agreed “that the common features rendered this evidence logically relevant and probative. Further, the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice for the purposes of MRE 403.” Affirmed.