Due process; In re Rood; Proper service of the summons & notice of the combined hearing; MCL 712A.12; Personal service; In re Dearmon; In re Brown; MCR 3.920(B)(4); Alternative method when personal service is impracticable; MCL 712A.13; Waiver under MCR 3.920(H)

The court held that because respondent-mother “was not served in accordance with the statutory mandates, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and thus plainly erred by proceeding with the adjudication trial and termination hearing. The lack of jurisdiction renders all trial court proceedings void.” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order of adjudication and order terminating her parental rights, and remanded. There was no evidence that she “was personally served with notice of the petition and the time and place for hearing. The proof of service reflects that the summons was delivered to and signed for by [her] grandmother at the address that respondent last reported to the trial court as her residence. The trial court accepted the DHHS’s argument that service was proper because the documents were signed by an adult residing at the same address as respondent. But service of a summons and notice of a termination proceeding on a parent is governed by MCL 712A.12, which requires that the parent be personally served.” Further, there was “no evidence that the DHHS moved for alternate service or that the trial court determined that personal service on respondent would be impracticable.” And she did not execute “a written waiver of service of process or notice of hearing.” The court rejected DHHS’s assertion that her “appearance at the adjudication trial and termination hearing and failure to raise objections” about a specific service defect constituted a waiver. A “‘probate court’s jurisdiction over children is derived solely from the state constitution and statutes.’ MCL 712A.12 plainly states that a parent must be personally served with notice of a termination proceeding hearing. Although the statute states that personal service may be waived in writing, it does not state that a person’s appearance and participation in a hearing constitutes a waiver of any defects in service unless objections regarding the specific defect are made. Thus, there is a conflict between MCL 712A.12 and MCR 3.920.” Although the “Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to determine rules of practice and procedure . . . it ‘is not authorized to enact court rules that establish, abrogate, or modify the substantive law.’ Because the issue of service is a jurisdictional one, MCL 712A.12 prevails.”