First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 USC § 1983; “Protected speech”; A “matter of public concern”; Whether plaintiff’s Michigan Occupational Safety & Health Administration (MiOSHA) complaint about required Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) involved a matter of public concern; Whether plaintiff’s speech at a meeting involved a matter of public concern

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants-University of Michigan Dental School administrators on plaintiff-Stanalajczo’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that he failed to show his speech about required clinic PPE was on a matter of public concern. During the COVID-19 crisis, Stanalajczo, an adjunct dental professor at the School, claimed that the extra PPE gowns and equipment, combined with air conditioning issues, led to overheating. Defendant-Perry, the School’s safety director, sent an email with suggestions to avoid overheating. “Stanalajczo decided to ‘reply all’ to the roughly 1,000 recipients of the email and express his concerns with the policy.” He then filed a health complaint about the PPE to MiOSHA, which found the “Dental School’s response satisfactory” and declined to conduct an inspection. The School later conducted a town hall meeting for faculty, staff, and students to discuss the PPE issue. After the meeting, “Perry submitted an internal complaint about Stanalajczo’s behavior at the meeting and in his emails “ Defendant-Johnson conducted an investigation into the complaint, and the School later fired Stanalajczo after he refused to view and complete tasks related to three educational videos regarding workplace behavior. He then filed this action. On appeal, the court considered the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim. It focused on whether he had engaged in constitutionally protected speech. This required him to have spoken on a matter of public concern, i.e. speech that “relates to issues of ‘political, social, or other concern to the community’ and is of ‘public import.’” The court held that he had not. It noted an employee’s “concerns that ‘management has acted incompetently’ or complaints about ‘internal personnel disputes’ are usually not protected.” Speech that merely touches “on areas of general public interest” is insufficient. Stanalajczo’s MiOSHA complaint expressed concerns about “a ‘personal interest’ in workplace conditions for Stanalajczo and those working with him[,]” and did not involve “an issue of ‘political, social, or other concern to the community.’” This analysis also held true as to his statements at the open meeting. “As unfortunate and frustrating as the conditions might have been for those who worked in the clinic, a dispute about discomfort caused by required protective gear in a clinical setting does not rise to the level of public concern. So it is not protected by the First Amendment.”