Ineffective assistance of counsel; Whether a naturalized defendant’s attorney has a Sixth Amendment duty to inform a client that a guilty plea could result in denaturalization; Farhane v United States (2d Cir); Whether denaturalization was only a “collateral consequence” stemming from the plea agreement; Chaidez v United States; Padilla v Kentucky

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that neither the Sixth Amendment nor case precedent require defense attorneys to notify a naturalized citizen that a guilty plea may lead to denaturalization. Defendant-Singh’s application for asylum was denied. He then “submitted another asylum application listing a different name, birth date, place of birth, and parents. None of this new information was true.” After he married an American citizen, he “applied for permanent-resident status, using the same false information listed on his second asylum application.” He falsely attested that he had never been denied an immigration benefit and that he had never offered false information on an immigration form. He was granted permanent-resident status and eventually became a naturalized U.S. citizen. He later pled guilty to using a fraudulent passport. When the government began proceedings to denaturalize him, he sought a writ of coram nobis before the district court, arguing that his conviction was invalid because his attorney never informed him that pleading guilty could result in denaturalization. But his plea agreement warned that his “plea could ‘affect or even foreclose his eligibility to remain in this country.’” The district court denied the writ. He later moved for reconsideration based on the Second Circuit’s decision in Farhane, which “held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to advise naturalized citizens of the risk of denaturalization and eventual deportation following a guilty plea.” The district court denied his motion. On appeal, the court found that “Farhane misapplied longstanding Supreme Court precedent.” It noted that the Supreme Court held in Chaidez that a “defense attorney isn’t constitutionally required to inform his client of any collateral consequences stemming from the plea agreement.” The court declined Singh’s urging to adopt Farhane, rejecting that court’s efforts to “shoehorn denaturalization into Padilla’s holding.” It noted that “a criminal conviction isn’t ‘enmeshed’ with denaturalization like it is with deportation. So the rationale for requiring a defense attorney to advise his client of the risk of deportation following a guilty plea simply doesn’t apply in the denaturalization context.” Affirmed.