Sentencing after revoking supervised release; Procedural & substantive reasonableness; Predetermining defendant’s post-revocation prison term at an earlier violation hearing; Inverting the sentencing sequence; 18 USC § 3583(e)(3); Whether the sentence-in-advance method inherently results in non-individualized prison terms; Consideration of the § 3553(a) factors

The court vacated defendant-Barton’s sentence and remanded, holding “that when a district court predetermines a supervisee’s revocation prison term at an earlier violation hearing,” the imposed prison term “is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.” Barton pled guilty to a child pornography offense and served his prison time. He violated his supervised release by committing a misdemeanor disorderly conduct violation, leaving the state, and possessing an internet-connected tablet that he used to view adult pornography. The district court gave him the choice of either serving an additional six-month Guidelines term of imprisonment, or continuing his supervised release with a caveat: “if Barton committed a future violation, the district court would impose a statutory-maximum two-year term of imprisonment.” It also added a condition prohibiting viewing “sexually explicit material.” Barton chose supervised release but committed another violation by possessing another internet-connected tablet that he used to view adult pornography. At the second violation hearing, the district court referenced both the advisory range and the two-year statutory maximum. It then discussed its prior two-year sentence ultimatum, emphasizing that Barton had made his choice. It then imposed the statutory-maximum two-year term in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. The court first held that “the district court’s sentence-in-advance method” was procedurally unreasonable for two reasons. The “district court inverted the proper sentencing sequence[,]” i.e., the post-revocation prison term must be imposed “at the end” of a sequence that begins with calculating the Guidelines and considering the § 3553(a) factors, not at the start of it. The court also held that “the sentence-in-advance method inherently results in non-individualized” prison terms. The district court “‘simply default[ed] to its prior comments at the [earlier] hearing’” in imposing sentence, making it procedurally unreasonable. Further, the court found the sentence substantively unreasonable. There was no “presumption of reasonableness” where Barton’s sentence was above the Guidelines, and the court concluded the district court gave “the § 3553(a) factors virtually no weight whatsoever.” District courts must “craft individualized revocation terms of imprisonment after considering the” parties’ evidence and arguments.