Ripeness; MCL 462.26(1); In re Reliability Plans of Elec Utils for 2017-2021; Compatible renewable energy ordinance; MCL 460.1221(f); Affected local unit; MCL 460.1221(a); Hybrid facilities; MCL 460.1222(1); Statutory timeline; MCL 460.1223(3); Agency interpretation; Enforcing statutes as written; In re Implementing Section 6w of 2016 PA 341 for Cloverland Elec Coop; Administrative Procedures Act (APA); “Rule”; MCL 24.207; O’Halloran v Secretary of State; Public Service Commission (PSC)

The court held that the PSC misinterpreted PA 233 as to the statutory timeline and improperly rewrote the definition of an affected local unit (ALU), but otherwise did not err in implementing the Act. Appellants-multiple townships and counties challenged a PSC order implementing PA 233, which governs certification for certain wind, solar, and energy-storage facilities. The PSC had interpreted statutory terms, addressed hybrid facilities, set application procedures, and described when developers could proceed before the PSC. On appeal, the court first held that the appeal was ripe because the PSC’s order was “‘a threshold determination that was not dependent on any further decision by the PSC’” and had “real-world implications” for local governmental units. The court next held that the PSC properly interpreted compatible renewable energy ordinance (CREO) because “the addition of requirements not contained in MCL 460.1226(8) would inherently be more restrictive,” and PA 233 limits CREOs to requirements no more restrictive than those statutory standards. But the court held that the PSC improperly narrowed ALU because the statute provides a “purely geographic definition,” and the PSC’s zoning-jurisdiction limitation “effectively re-writes the statutory definition of ALU[.]” The court also upheld the PSC’s treatment of hybrid facilities because it “merely gave a name to a concept implicit in the statutory text.” The court further held that the PSC incorrectly changed the CREO-notice timeline because “the 30-day timeline begins not with the receipt of the offer to meet but with the actual meeting . . . .” Finally, the court held that APA rulemaking was unnecessary because the PSC’s order “did not establish a regulation or policy having the force and effect of law. Rather, the PSC interpreted the relevant statutes, which did not require rulemaking.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.