Age discrimination; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Town v Michigan Bell Tel Co; Qualified for the position requirement; Lack of a covering physician as a nondiscriminatory reason to not grant clinical privileges; Michigan Antitrust Reform Act violation; MCL 445.772; Conspiracy; Tortious interference with a business relationship; Waiver by release; Lack of any malicious acts in bad faith; Dalley v Dykema Gossett, PLLC; Motion to extend discovery & compel response to discovery requests; MCR 2.301(B)(4); Timeliness; Prejudice

The court held that the trial court did not err in (1) denying plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery and compel defendant to respond to discovery requests or (2) granting defendant summary disposition on plaintiff’s age discrimination, antitrust, and tortious interference claims. Plaintiff, who was born in 1942, is a doctor. The case arose from his “application for clinical privileges at Beaumont Wayne Hospital (Beaumont Wayne), which defendant operates.” On appeal, the court first considered plaintiff’s arguments as to discovery. It noted that he “waited until less than a month before the close of discovery to submit [his] first document production request to defendant. For its part, defendant did not produce documents or respond to” his request for production until “two months after the discovery cutoff.” The court further noted that “plaintiff’s counsel waited another month after the response to move to extend discovery. Discovery had been closed for three months when plaintiff filed his motion, and nearly five months when the trial court denied the motion. Stated simply, plaintiff was dilatory in pursuing discovery. Given the significant delay before [he] moved to extend discovery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling the motion was untimely. [It] also did not err by ruling defendant would be prejudiced by extending discovery.” As to the trial court’s summary disposition rulings, plaintiff’s age discrimination claim failed because he did not show “he was qualified for clinical privileges.” There was no “dispute that proof of a covering physician was necessary to grant clinical privileges,” and the individual who initially agreed to serve as plaintiff’s covering physician later declined to do so. “There was no evidence plaintiff obtained another covering physician agreement.” The court added that “his lack of a covering physician was a nondiscriminatory reason to not grant him clinical privileges.” As to his antitrust and tortious interference claims, the court concluded the trial court did not err in “applying the release of liability in this matter.” While the release “only waived liability for defendant’s acts performed in good faith and without malice[,]” the court found that dismissal of the claims was proper “because defendant did not perform any malicious acts in bad faith relevant to either claim.” Affirmed.