Motion to set aside a default judgment; MCR 2.603(D)(1); “Good cause”; Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC; Shawl v Spence Bros, Inc; Service of process; Credibility determination; Due process; Opportunity to be heard; Sanctions for filing a frivolous motion; MCR 2.625(A)(2); MCL 600.2591

Holding that defendant-appellant did not present a basis to set aside the default judgment, and that the trial court properly imposed sanctions against him for filing a frivolous motion, the court affirmed. The default judgment quieted title to a parcel of property in plaintiff. After denying defendant’s motion to set it aside, the trial court issued $500 in sanctions against him. It conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion, “during which it addressed the issue of whether plaintiff properly served defendant, and it found the statements of plaintiff’s counsel more credible than that of defendant and” his partner. Defendant essentially asked the court to reach a different conclusion as to witness credibility. It declined to do so. It also noted that while “the trial court appeared to consider the status of plaintiff’s counsel as an officer of the court in resolving credibility, it expressly stated that its determination was based on ‘the whole facts and circumstances of this case.’ Moreover, the proof of service document and the time stamps reflected in” a 9/23 hearing transcript for a related eviction proceeding corroborated counsel’s representations. The court further found that defendant failed to show “that he was denied an opportunity to be heard.” He did not establish how any bar to cross-examining plaintiff’s counsel “deprived him of due process. He was afforded a meaningful opportunity to present his position and to contest the assertions of plaintiff’s counsel regarding service.” As to the sanctions award, the record did not show “that defendant maintained a viable interest in the subject property” and even assuming his “proffered land contract and payment receipts were authentic, Michigan’s race-notice statute” governed priority. Plaintiff recorded its interest in the “property approximately two years before defendant recorded his purported land contract” (which was unfulfilled).