Termination under § 19b(3)(j); The trial court’s jurisdiction; Failure to strictly comply with MCR 3.972(F); Advice of appellate rights; Due process; In re Ferranti; Harmless error; Assumption of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1); Child’s best interests; Effect of relative placement

On remand from the Supreme Court, the court concluded that respondent-mother was not entitled to relief on the basis the trial court failed to strictly comply with MCR 3.972(F). It also held that (1) the evidence supported the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1); (2) the trial court did not clearly err in terminating her parental rights under § (j); and (3) terminating her rights was in the child’s (CD) best interests. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new appeal after respondent raised ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. She argued here that the trial court did not properly advise her of her appellate rights. The court agreed that it “did not comply with the court rules” in this regard. But while this error was “not insignificant,” the court found that it did not warrant reversal. The case went “to a jury trial at which DHHS was required to prove a statutory basis for jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Mother was afforded her core due-process protections, including representation by trial counsel and an opportunity to contest the allegations against her. The jury’s verdict supplied the factual predicate necessary for the [trial] court to exercise jurisdiction, and that determination is not challenged on the basis of any defect in the adjudicative procedure itself. Thus, the asserted error did not implicate the constitutional validity of the adjudication.” The court added that the alleged error did not “require reversal as a matter of rule-based compliance. A violation of a court rule does not automatically entitle a party to relief. Rather, the error must be shown to have affected the outcome or otherwise undermined the fairness or reliability of the proceedings.” Respondent failed to make that showing. Given the appellate proceedings, “if the trial court’s advisement was incomplete, [she] was not deprived of the ability to seek appellate review, and the purpose of MCR 3.972(F) was not frustrated in any meaningful sense.” As to § (j), given her “unresolved issues, lack of insight, and continued poor judgment, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that returning CD to her care would place CD at risk of harm.” Finally, the child was doing well in his placement with his father, and the “trial court reasonably concluded that termination was necessary to provide CD with permanence and to protect him from ongoing risk associated with mother’s conduct.” Affirmed.