Malicious destruction of a building; Intent to destroy or damage; MCL 750.380(3)(a); People v Nelson; Sufficiency of the evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move for a directed verdict; People v Riley; Prison attire; People v Harris; Evidentiary error; Surveillance-video title; Jury instructions; Accident defense; Court costs; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); People v Konopka; Restitution; MCL 769.1a(2); Indigency; People v Jackson

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s malicious-destruction conviction, that no trial-related prejudice required reversal, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to waive costs, fees, and restitution. Defendant, an inmate at a correctional facility, became agitated and threw a dense plastic garbage can weighing several pounds into a glass window, breaking it. On appeal, the court first held that the evidence supported an intent to destroy or damage the property because defendant was agitated, used his “whole body” to throw the can, stepped toward the glass, created torque by lifting his back leg, and then “sauntered up to the door and sneered at the camera.” Although defendant testified that he did not intend to break the glass and was “shocked” when it broke, the jury was not required to credit that testimony. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient and the motion would have been futile. The court next held that defendant was not prejudiced by jail-issued clothing because the tan khakis did “not readily resemble prison attire,” and the record did not support his claim that MDOC guards were improperly positioned near him. It also held that the surveillance-video title identifying defendant as breaking the glass did not affect substantial rights because those facts were uncontested and cumulative. The court further held that the jury instructions adequately covered intent and accident because they stated that if defendant “did not intend to damage or destroy the property, he is not guilty.” Finally, the court upheld the costs, fees, and restitution because existing precedent rejected defendant’s tax arguments, the court costs were reasonably related to a jury trial, and defendant failed to prove extraordinary financial circumstances. Affirmed.