Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Bahoda; Vouching; Admission of testimony about delayed disclosure & victim behavior; Admission of a text message including song lyrics about abuse & survival; Relevance; MRE 401; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Exclusion of evidence under the rape-shield statute (MCL 750.520j); People v Hackett; People v Adair; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 11 & 13; MCL 777.41(1)(a); MCL 777.43(1)(a) & (2)(a); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the verdict form & at sentencing; Motion for a new trial based on late day verdict

The court rejected defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It also held that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony in this CSC case about (1) “delayed disclosure and victim behavior” and (2) a text message that included “song lyrics about abuse and survival.” Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit evidence under the rape-shield statute or in denying his motion for a new trial on the basis the jury returned its verdict late in the day. Finally, the court upheld the scoring of 50 points each for OVs 11 and 13. Defendant was convicted of CSC I and sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to 15 to 25 years. The court first concluded that he could not show defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the verdict form. The “prosecution presented evidence of repeated sexual abuse occurring over a defined time period, all satisfying the elements of” CSC I. “The jury was not asked to choose between legally distinct offenses, nor did the instructions create a risk that some jurors convicted on one theory while others relied on a separate theory.” There was no indication of jury confusion or that the “form prevented the jurors from fairly considering the case.” Next, the court rejected his claim that the prosecution improperly vouched for the victim’s (JC) credibility. “JC’s credibility was the central issue at trial. The prosecutor’s argument was directed at explaining why the jury should find her testimony credible, based on the evidence presented. The prosecutor’s statements that JC was telling the truth were not assertions of personal knowledge or authority. Instead, they were rhetorical conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Such arguments were permissible. In addition, the “remarks were responsive to the defense theory that JC’s allegations were fabricated or unreliable.” The court also found that the testimony of two prosecution witnesses did not constitute improper vouching. It further determined that testimony explaining delayed disclosure and victim behavior “was relevant because it assisted the jury in evaluating JC’s credibility and understanding conduct that might otherwise appear inconsistent with abuse.” As to the evidence defendant sought to admit “suggesting that JC had previously been sexually assaulted by” someone else, he failed to comply with the threshold requirements. Affirmed.