Failure to stop at accident scene; Knowledge element; MCL 257.617; MCL 257.619; Charging defect; MCR 6.101(A) & 6.112(A); Jury instructions; People v Dumback; Other acts evidence; Arrest warrants; MRE 404(b); Motive to flee; People v VanderVliet; Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; Prosecutorial error; Burden shifting; People v Fields; Habitual offender sentencing; MCL 769.12; Attempted felony; People v Slocum

The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief from his conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in serious impairment or death or from his fourth-offense habitual-offender sentence. Defendant struck a bicyclist while driving, stopped 200 to 300 feet away, continued driving, and later claimed he thought he had hit a trashcan or mailbox. On appeal, the court first rejected defendant’s charging-defect argument because MCL 257.617 requires knowledge that the driver was “involved in an accident,” not knowledge that the accident involved “an individual or” another vehicle. The court held that the charging documents adequately tracked the statute by alleging that defendant “knew or had reason to believe” he had been involved in an accident. The court next held that the jury was properly instructed for the same reason, explaining that the trial court correctly required proof that defendant “knew or had reason to know that he had been involved in an accident.” The court also found that evidence of outstanding arrest warrants was admissible after defendant offered an innocent explanation for leaving the scene because it showed “ulterior motivations” to flee, and the trial court limited prejudice by excluding the nature of the warrants. The court further held that gambling-related testimony was relevant to defendant’s timeline and nap claim, and that officers’ accident-scene observations were proper lay opinion because they gave “a general idea of where and how the accident occurred.” The court rejected defendant’s burden-shifting argument because the prosecutor permissibly challenged the reliability of his new gas-station-nap claim. Finally, the court found that attempted resisting and obstructing could support the fourth-offense habitual enhancement because MCL 769.12 applies to “felonies or attempts to commit felonies.” Affirmed.