Sufficiency of the evidence for an accosting a child for an immoral purpose conviction; MCL 750.145a; People v Darga; Vagueness challenge to the statute; People v Gaines; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a futile constitutional challenge; Failure to seek a stipulation as to prior convictions; Applicability of Old Chief v United States & People v Swint

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of accosting a child for an immoral purpose, and that the statute (MCL 750.145a) is not unconstitutionally vague. It also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He contended “the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he ‘accosted’ [victim-]XW because, unlike in Darga, there was no evidence that he spoke to XW in an ‘aggressive, challenging, or threatening way.’” The court found this argument was “misplaced. First, defendant ignores that ‘enticing’ or ‘soliciting’ are alternative bases to convict him, and that ‘accosting’ is not required.” It noted that he did “not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of enticement or solicitation. Second, while true that, unlike in Darga, there was no evidence here that defendant yelled at XW, threatened him, or commanded him to engage in a sex act, this fact does not mean the evidence was insufficient to convict. Regardless of his tone, defendant approached XW, an unaccompanied 14-year-old, inside a gas station and said, ‘You look like you could use a blowjob,’ and that XW ‘needed a blowjob.’ After XW went outside the gas station, defendant circled the gas station multiple times and waved at XW at least once. At minimum, a rational juror could conclude that defendant made the comments to ‘entice’ or ‘solicit’ or ‘accost’ XW to engage in the sexual acts that he described as those terms are defined.” As to his vagueness argument, the court held in Gaines that MCL 750.145a is not unconstitutionally vague. And the court concluded that no reasonable person would have to guess whether his statements to XW sought “to induce an ‘immoral act’ under the statute.” He also could not show “prejudice because the use of the word ‘immoral’ within the context of MCL 750.145a specifically describes his conduct toward XW that resulted in a guilty conviction.” Finally, his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring a meritless constitutional challenge to the statute or for not seeking a stipulation to conceal “the number and nature of his prior convictions.” Affirmed.