Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Suspension of parenting time; MCL 712A.13a(13); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Mason; Children’s best interests; Relative placement; In re CJM; Guardianship alternative; In re Lombard; Guardian ad litem (GAL)

The court held that: 1) the trial court did not reversibly err by suspending respondents’ parenting time, 2) the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, 3) § (c)(i) supported termination, and 4) termination was in the children’s best interests. The case arose after respondent-father chased a child through a field with his truck and tackled him, while respondent-mother allegedly supported the conduct and helped restrain the child in the truck. On appeal, the court first held that the ex parte suspension of parenting time was not reversible error because the GAL’s allegations, taken at face value, were sufficient to show that “‘parenting time, even if supervised, may be harmful to the [children’s] life, physical health, or mental well-being.’” Further, the later termination petition supplied an independent basis for suspension. The court next held that the DHHS made reasonable efforts, including psychological evaluations, individual counseling, couples counseling, parenting classes, supportive visitation, and efforts to arrange family therapy, but respondents failed to show “meaningful progress.” As to statutory grounds, the court held that § (c)(i) was established because, after more than 182 days, the barriers involving mental health, domestic relations, and parenting skills remained unresolved. The court emphasized that “‘mere participation is not the same as overcoming the barriers in place,’” and respondents’ conduct during parenting time showed only minimal change. The court also held that termination was in the children’s best interests because the parent-child bond was “‘definitely broken,’” the children improved after parenting time was suspended, several children feared returning home, and respondents had no meaningful safety plan. Finally, the court rejected the guardianship argument as to one child (K) because the DHHS considered guardianship, but K did not want continued contact with respondents and adoption better served her interests. Affirmed.