Sentencing; Consideration of youth as a mitigating factor; People v Boykin; Miller v Alabama; People v Snow; Alleged de facto life sentence; Distinguishing People v Eads; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v Trakhtenberg; Arguing the correct legal standard; Investigation & presentation of mitigating evidence; Failure to hire an expert

The court concluded the trial court adequately considered defendant’s youth at the time of the crimes as a mitigating factor in resentencing him, and that his 40 to 75-year sentences for first-degree murder were proportionate. It also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He was 15 at the time of the crimes. He claimed that the trial court did not “follow Boykin because it failed to provide sufficient analysis on the record for its consideration of his youth under the Miller and Snow factors. But” the court noted that “Boykin imposed no such requirement on the trial court.” As long as the record showed it considered his “youth as a mitigating factor, the trial court satisfied its burden. At resentencing, [it] explicitly referenced [his] youth but reasoned that this did not outweigh the severity of the crime. It properly applied the principle of proportionality, by balancing defendant’s youth with the severity of the crime and his actions. Given the deliberate, premeditated nature of the offense and the fact that [he] shot two women a total of four times over a suspected fake $10 bill, the trial court’s ultimate imposition of 40 to 75 years’ imprisonment despite the mitigating nature of defendant’s young age at the time cannot be said to fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” The court also disagreed that his sentence was “an impermissible de facto life sentence” and as a result, “cruel or unusual under Eads.” This case was factually distinguishable “because defendant here was convicted of first-degree murder, and, therefore, was given the statutory procedural safeguards under MCL 769.25 that the defendant in Eads lacked.” His resentencing fell under MCL 769.25(1)(b)(ii) and 769.25(9) imposes a maximum of “‘not less than 60 years and’” a minimum of “‘not less than 25 years or more than 40 years.’” Thus, his sentence was within the statutory range and presumed proportionate and constitutional. He offered no “argument on appeal that his case presents any unusual circumstances that render his presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate, nor are any readily apparent from the record.” Finally, the court rejected his claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing “to ‘argue the correct legal standard’ during resentencing,” not properly investigating his history and presenting it as mitigating evidence, and failing to hire an expert witness. Affirmed.