Habeas corpus; The Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); Deferential standard of review; Self-representation; Whether defendant’s waiver of counsel was “unequivocal”; Whether the waiver was voluntary

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief, holding that there were “reasonable arguments” that petitioner-Karacson voluntarily waived his right to counsel. A Michigan jury convicted him of arson of his own home and insurance fraud. Before trial, he filed grievances against two attorneys who were appointed to represent him. The first one withdrew and the second informed the trial court that Karacson wished to represent himself. “On the day of jury selection, Karacson confirmed” this. The trial court warned him of the dangers arising from self-representation and appointed his counsel as his standby advisor. After a lunch break, Karacson said that he was not willing to proceed and wanted a new attorney. The trial court denied his request, noting that he had requested to represent himself and that a group of potential jurors were “‘waiting in the hallway[.]’” Karacson carried on with standby counsel. In his habeas petition, he argued that, although he represented himself at trial, he had not waived his right to an attorney. The district court denied the writ, concluding that the Michigan courts had “reasonably rejected his claim on direct appeal.” On appeal here, the court explained that the AEDPA requires a “highly deferential” standard of review. If “any reasonable argument supports the state court’s decision, Karacson can’t obtain relief.” It concluded the record showed he “knowingly and intelligently waived” his right to counsel before trial. He expressed his desire to represent himself to his second attorney, and confirmed this to the trial court “when he said he ‘believe[d]’ he wanted to represent himself.” The trial court then “proceeded to ensure Karacson was committed to representing himself.” It appropriately informed him of the procedural requirements and of the risks that come with self-representation. He responded, “Yes, sir.” And when the trial court asked if he was sure he wanted to do that, he again answered, “Yes.” The court found that this “clear affirmation established that, despite knowing the trouble he might face, Karacson intentionally waived his right to counsel” Further, he repeatedly confirmed his choice during the trial. The court held that there was “a sufficient basis to find unequivocal waiver.” It also held that his waiver was voluntary. He could not “show that his attorney was unprepared for trial. Instead, a fairminded jurist could decide that Karacson had a reasonable choice between adequate counsel and representing himself.”